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BELK OF SPARTANB URG, S. C. v. THOMPSON: AN
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNIQUES
EMPLOYED TO VALUE MINORITY INTERESTS IN
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS N DISSENTERS'
RIGHTS CASES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the South Carolina dissenters' rights statute, minority shareholders who
dissent from certain corporate actions may petition a state court for the "fair value"
of their shares.1 However, what constitutes fair value is not clear. What exactly do
minority shareholders own when they hold stock in a closely held corporation, and
how should the courts properly compensate these shareholders when they seek an
appraisal of the fair value of their shares?
As stated by one authority, "Valuation issues pervade the work that legal,
financial, and accounting professionals engage in every day, especially when such
professionals work with closely held businesses. . . [It is important that
professionals ... possess.., a rudimentary understanding of valuation of closely
held businesses in order to serve their clients properly."2 In Belk of Spartanburg,
S.C. v. Thompson3 the South Carolina Court ofAppeals afforded an overview of the
valuation methodology employed by South Carolina courts. At the same time, Belk
illustrates that there are unanswered questions in South Carolina valuation
jurisprudence.
Part II of this Note reviews the South Carolina dissenters' rights statute, the
Belk decision, and cases which preceded and informed Belk's analysis. Part m
describes valuation techniques and suggests how Belk's analysis could be expanded
to provide a more complete explanation of fair value in dissenters' rights cases.

1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101 to -310 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999). These corporate
actions include, inter alia,mergers, share exchanges, and sales or exchanges of all, or substantially all,
of the property of the corporation other than in the usual course of business. Id. § 33-13-102(A). The
statute also provides that the minority shareholder may dissent from "any corporate action to the extent
the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors provides that voting or
nonvoting shareholders are entitled to dissent and obtain payment for their shares." Id. This broad
provision contrasts with the requirement that the shareholder be entitled to vote on the corporate actions
discussed in the text of the statute. Thus, unless this provision applies, minority shareholders may
dissent only if they are entitled to vote on the corporate action to which they object. Dissenters' rights
are further limited to shares which are not "listed on a national securities exchange or designated as a
national market system security." Id. § 33-13-102(B). Although dissenters' appraisal rights are
controversial, every state now has a provision for such rights. DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF
MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrIONs 72, 75 (West Group ed., 1999).
2. LEwis D. SOLOMON & LEwIs J. SARET, VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD BusINESSES: LEGAL
AND TAx ASPECTS § 1.1, at 1 (1998).
3. 337 S.C. 109, 522 S.E.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1999).
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BACKGROUND

,4. South Carolina'sDissenters'Rights Statute
Historically, state courts, interpreting strict corporate codes, required
unanimous shareholder consent for all extraordinary corporate acts, because such4
acts materially altered each shareholder's investment contract with the corporation.
This requirement proved burdensome as corporations became more complex, so
many state legislatures gradually reduced the default consent requirement to a
simple majority of all outstanding shares.5 To offset the minority shareholders' loss
of the veto power, the legislatures granted them appraisal rights, often referred to
as dissenters' rights.6
The tension between majority and minority interests is a financial reality in
almost any corporation, and state legislatures have attempted to strike a balance that
protects minority shareholders while allowing the controlling shareholders to be
entrepreneurial. 7 The purpose of dissenters' rights statutes is fairness, and these
statutes serve "as a check against rampant majority rule."8 Therefore, if a fair price
is not determined by fair valuation mechanisms, the statutes fail in theirpurpose and
the minority shareholders are "vulnerable to abuse at the hands of the majority."9
As the Official Comment to the South Carolina dissenters' rights statute states,
"[T]he majority is given an almost unlimited power to change the nature and shape
of the enterprise and the rights of its members. On the other hand, the members who
dissent from these changes are given a right to withdraw their investment at a fair
value."1 °
While the historical foundation and purpose of the statute are not difficult to
divine, applying the statute is a different matter. The statute defines fair value as
"the value of the shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action
to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in
anticipation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects ...unless
exclusion would be inequitable."'" The shares are to be valued "by techniques that

4. OESTERLE, supranote 1, at 21.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 22; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101 cmt. 1 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (noting the

"tension between the desire of corporate leadership to be able to enter new fields, acquire new
enterprises, and rearrange investor rights and the desire of investors to adhere to the rights and the risks
on the basis of which they invested").
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101 cmt. 1.
8. BarryM. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'AppraisalRemedy andHow CourtsDetermineFair
Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 613 (1998).
9. Id.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101 cmt. 1. The Official Comment also notes that parties should
"settle their differences in private negotiations, without resort to judicial appraisal proceedings." Id.
However, minority shareholders are usually relatively powerless, so the statute affords them an
appraisal remedy to ensure that they receive a fair price for their shares and are not disenfranchised.
Id.
11. Id. § 33-13-101(3).
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are accepted generally in the financial community."' 2 Although these vague terms
give courts flexibility to consider equitable notions in dissenters' rights cases, they
also deprive the courts of guidance in their attempts to ascertain fair value. 3
B. Background
Although the appraisal remedy has been available in the United States for well
over a century, it has only recently seen a great deal of use.14 Nevertheless, issues
raised in several early cases remain important in modem dissenters' rights cases.
In the Ohio case of Miller v. Canton Motor Coach, Inc., 5 the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that a dissenting shareholder was entitled to the "fair cash value" of
his stock. 6 The court struggled with the meaning of fair cash value, ultimately
concluding that this value was not "fair market value," but rather the "intrinsic
worth of the stock."' 7
An early South Carolina case, Johnson v. Baldwin, 8 suggests the policy
underlying the present-day South Carolina dissenters' rights statute. The court
addressed the tension between majority and minority interests and concluded that
the statute "was intended to afford fair and just compensation to the dissenters and
at the same time provide a method by which their objections could be fairly
composed so as to enable the consolidation to proceed."' 9

12. Id.
13. As the statute itself points out, the provision "unless exclusion would be inequitable" follows
the Delaware Supreme Court's reasoning in Weinberger v. UOP,Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), a
seminal valuation case discussed in more detail later. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101 cmt. 2. In
Weinberger,the court found that the transaction did not involve fair dealing or fair price and crafted
a remedy that attempted to "do" equity. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 711, 714; see also SHANNON P.
PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTIcEs 371 (1986) (noting that the
Weinberger court demanded that both the value conclusion and appraisal procedures be fair).
14. See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 616 (attributing the recent upsurge in appraisal
litigation to post-Weinberger fallout); MELvIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 75 (1976) (noting that Ohio had appraisal statutes as early as the 1850s).
15. 16 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937).
16. Id. at 488.
17. Id. at 489. The Miller court cited Manningv. Brandon Corp., 163 S.C. 178, 186, 161 S.E.
405, 408 (1931), an early South Carolina case which stated that "[the appraisal] statute should be
construed liberally in favor of the stockholder." Id. at 488. The Manning court concluded that the
minority shareholder had been stripped of his equity position against his wishes, and construed fair
value to include the full value of his stock plus costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 186, 161 S.E. at 408.
18. 221 S.C. 141, 69 S.E.2d 585 (1952).
19. Id. at 154, 69 S.E.2d at 591. Another early South Carolina case, Johnson v. Spartanburg
County FairAss'n, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947), explored statutory policy, noting that the
majority shareholders have the final decision as to the price at which corporate assets are to be sold,
absent fraud or illegality. Id. at 70,41 S.E.2d at 605. Therefore, the court reasoned that the dissenting
shareholders had "a plain and adequate remedy-at-law in the appraisal proceedings to secure the fair
value of [their] stock." Id.
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The seminal South Carolina valuation case is Santee Oil Company v. Cox, 20 and
most of Belk's valuation analysis is drawn from Santee.2' Santee states several
propositions crucial to South Carolina's modem valuation jurisprudence. For
example, Santee states that 'fair value' does not restrict the appraising court to the
' Citing Delaware law,23 the supreme court
use of any one method of valuation."22
held that both market value and net asset value, discussed below, are appropriate,
non-exclusive measures of valuation.24 Accordingly, each case is to be decided on
its own facts and circumstances, and every financial factor relevant to the value of
the corporate property, and ultimately to the value of its stock, is to be considered.25
Although Santee constitutes an important road map to determining intrinsic26
value, the opinion acknowledges that valuation entails subjectivity and judgment.
Appraisers and courts must decide how to weigh each of the aforementioned
valuation methods as they evaluate a myriad of financial data.27 Ultimately, of
course, the courts often face the task of choosing from among widely varying value
figures, each of which is posited by an "expert," and each of which may seem
completely plausible under the circumstances. 28 The South Carolina Supreme
Court's opinion in Segall v. Shore29 frankly concedes that valuing the stock of a
closely held business is difficult and fact-specific.3 °
C. Belk of Spartanburg, S.C. v. Thompson

20. 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
21. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
22. Santee, 265 S.C. at 273, 217 S.E.2d at 791.
23. The Santee court cited Delaware law because Delaware is home to a great number of
corporations and has corporation law similar to South Carolina's. Id. (citing the Delaware case of
Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 457 (Del. Ch. 1934) for the proposition that a court is not
restricted to any one method of valuation).
24. Santee, 265 S.C. at 274, 217 S.E.2d at 791.
25. Id. at 273-74, 217 S.E.2d at 791.
26. Id. at 277, 217 S.E.2d at 793.
27. See, e.g., Metromont Materials Corp. v. Pennell, 270 S.C. 9,24,239 S.E.2d 753, 761 (1977)
(considering the weight to accord each of the three valuation methods in valuing a closely held family
business). TheMetromontcourt ultimately accorded 95% weight to the net asset value method because
it "was impressed by the testimony of one of the [dissenters'] experts who would have accorded the
factor 95% weight." Id. The court's acceptance of one expert's valuation testimony over other,
presumably qualified experts' testimony again demonstrates the highly subjective nature of valuation
analysis, and the importance ofhiring good experts. For a discussion ofwhat constitutes "good" expert
testimony, see SHANNONP. PRATr, VALUINGA BusiNEss: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY

HELD COMPANIES 657-73 (2d ed. 1989). Pratt concludes that courtroom demeanor, which includes a
confident (but not arrogant) and objective presentation ofthe expert's findings, is everybit as important
as technical expertise in influencing the judge's and/or jury's perception of the validity ofthe expert's
valuation analysis. Id. at 668-69.
28. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
29. 269 S.C. 31,236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
30. Id. at 37,263 S.E.2d at 318; see also Dibble v. Sumter Ice and Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278,284,
322 S.E.2d 674, 678 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that stock of closely held corporations cannot be valued
by applying any inflexible formula and claiming that such valuation can be reasonably effected only
by a formula tailored to the particular case).
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In Belk, minority shareholder Carolyn Thompson (Thompson) dissented from
Belk Department Store of Spartanburg, S.C., Inc.'s (BDS) decision to merge with
another Belk Department Store in Clinton, South Carolina.3 1 The resulting
corporation was named Belk of Spartanburg, Inc. (BOS) after the merger became
effective.32 BDS's tender of approximately fifteen hundred dollars per share was
based on the two most recent known transactions of BDS's stock, but Thompson
felt that her minority interest in this closely held corporation was being
undervalued.33 After the parties' negotiations failed to produce an agreement, BOS,
au required by the statute,34 petitioned the trial court to determine the fair value of
Thompson's shares.35 Each side produced numerous experts, and their "proposed
valuations ranged widely, from BOS's expert's valuation of $1,435.31 per share to
the dissenters' appraisal of $7,930.30 per share., 36 The trial court's valuation
analysis produced results much closer to the corporation's estimates than to
Thompson's estimates, and Thompson appealed.37
The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's valuation.35
However, the valuation process itself is of more interest than the numbers.
According to the Belk court, for the purposes of dissenters' rights cases, "'fair
value' is defined as 'intrinsic value.' ' 39 In the court's view, "The trial court must
undertake to compute the fair value by establishing the 'fair market value of the
corporate property as an established and going business."' 40 To establish fair value,
three factors are normally considered: "(1) net asset value, (2) market value, and
(3) the earnings or investment value of the dissenting stock."4' Finally, viewing the
facts and circumstances of each case, the court weighs each of these factors "as to
their relative bearing upon the ultimate determination of the fair value of the
dissenting stock."4' This process, explored further in Part I, is known as a Santee
analysis,43 deriving its name from the seminal South Carolina Supreme Court case.
Omitted from the Belk discussion were minority and marketability discounts.
Therefore, although Belkreaffirmed South Carolina's basic valuation methodology
in dissenters' rights cases, its analytical structure is incomplete.
South Carolina case law demonstrates the difficulty encountered when applying
technical tests to reach fair value in dissenters' rights cases. Ultimately, a statutory
31.
1999).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

789, 791
40.
41.
791).
42.
43.

Belk ofSpartanburg, S.C. v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 113-14,522 S.E.2d357, 359 (Ct. App.
Id. at 113, 522 S.E.2d at 359.
Id. at 114, 522 S.E.2d at 359.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Belk, 337 S.C. at 114, 522 S.E.2d at 359-60.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

114-15, 522 S.E.2d at 360.
115, 522 S.E.2d at 360.
128, 522 S.E.2d at 367.
116, 522 S.E.2d at 360 (citing Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270,273, 217 S.E.2d

(1975)).
Id. (quoting Santee, 265 S.C. at 273, 217 S.E.2d at 791).
See Belk, 337 S.C. at 116,522 S.E.2d at 361 (citing Santee, 265 S.C. at 274, 217 S.E.2d at
Id. (citing Santee, 265 S.C. at 274, 217 S.E.2d at 792).
Id.
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term as vague as "fair value" begs the question of what is indeed proper
compensation for minority interests in closely held corporations.
III. ANALYSIS
The South Carolina rule presently in effect employs three common valuation
methods: net asset value, market value, and discounted earnings or investment
value.' Each type of valuation is assigned a relative weight based on the facts and
circumstances ofthe case, and a share value is thereby derived." This Part considers
each of these methods in turn and assesses their feasibility and appropriateness in
the context of valuing dissenters' minority interests in closely held corporations.
A. DistinguishingFairMarket Valuefrom FairValue
Before delving into the methods used to obtain the fair value of the dissenters'
stock, it is important to draw a distinction between fair value and fair market value.
Fair market value is defined as "the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing seller and a willing buyer when neither is acting under
compulsion and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts." 6 Fair
market value presumes a hypothetical willing buyer and seller dealing at arm's
length and does not consider any values which would be ascribed to an investment
by a particular buyer or seller.47 The share price ofapublicly traded stock represents
its fair market value."

Fair value represents each share's portion of the intrinsic value of a going
concern."9 According to Pratt, an expert in business valuation, fair value is "an
excellent example of ambiguous terminology used in the field of commercial
appraisal. In order to understand what the expression means, you have to know the
context of its use.... [l]n most states, fair value is the statutory 5standard
of value
0
applicable in cases of dissenting stockholders' appraisal rights.
South Carolina courts have construed fair value to be intrinsic value in the
context of dissenters' rights cases. 5' Like fair market value, intrinsic value focuses
44. Belk, 337 S.C. 109, 124-25, 522 S.E.2d at 365 (Ct. App. 1999).
45. Id. at 124, 522 S.E.2d at 365.

46. SHANNON P. PRATrETAL., VALUING SMALLBusiNESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES 39
(3d ed. 1998) (quoting the ASA definition of fair market value).
47. Id.
48. Id. As Pratt points out, fair market value is the "price at which a transaction could be expected
to take place under conditions existing at the valuationdate." Id.
49. See supra text accompanying note 40.
50. See PRATr ET AL., supra note 46, at 45; see also Bobbie J. Hollis II, The Unfairness of
Applying Lack of MarketabilityDiscountsto Determine FairValue in Dissenters' Rights Cases, 25
J. CORP. L. 137, 141 (1999) (noting that "'[flair value' is not the same as, or short-hand for, 'fair
market value.' 'Fair value' carries with it the statutorypurpose that shareholders be fairly compensated,
which may or may not equate with the market's judgment about the stock's value." (citing Joseph W.
Anthony & Karlyn V. Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled... But Triumphant: Claims ofShareholders in
CloselyHeld Corporations,22 WM. MrrCHELLL. REV. 1173, 1186 (1996))).
51. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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on the "perceived characteristics inherent in the investment, not tempered by
characteristics peculiar to any one investor. Rather, this value is tempered by how
these perceived characteristics are interpreted by one analyst versus another."52
Intrinsic value is, in theory, the true or real worth of a security, not its current
market price.53 Various fundamental factors affect the intrinsic value of a security,
including the value of the firm's assets, likely future interest and dividends, likely
future earnings, and likely future growth rate. 4 However, as Pratt readily concedes,
it is very difficult to distinguish intrinsic value from fair market value because "the
actions of buyers and sellers based on their specific perceptions of intrinsic value
eventually lead to the generalconsensus market value and the constant and dynamic
changes in market value over time.""
B. Net Asset Value Method
The net asset value method is the easiest, most inexpensive, and least subjective
the
three valuation techniques.56 However, in its purest form, this method is a
of
poor indicator of the closely held corporation's current fair market value. 57 To use
this method, the appraiser refers to the company's balance sheet to obtain the book
values of the assets, deducts the book values of the liabilities, and arrives at the net
asset (or equity) value of the company.58
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, assets are carried on the
59
balance sheet at their historical cost or at the lower of their cost or market value.
When South Carolina courts employ the net asset value method, they should
consider following the "adjusted book value" approach. This modified approach
revalues the subject entity's assets and liabilities to their current market values and

52. See PRATT ET AL., supra note 46, at 43.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 44. Regardless of the difficulty in distinguishing fair market value from intrinsic value,
the Belk court rejected Thompson's attempts to obtain the "fair market value" of her shares. Belk of
Spartanburg, S.C. v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 115, 522 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Ct. App. 1999).
56. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 36.
57. Id.
58. Id. Book value is an accounting term, not an appraisal term, and does not represent any
standard of value at all. See PRATT, supra note 27, at 17. In effect, assets are placed "on the books"
when they are purchased, and thus are carried at their historical cost, subject to any deductions for
depreciation. Id. Liabilities are typically carried at face value. Id. As more time lapses from the
"booking" ofthe asset or liability, the relationship between book value and the market value, tenuous
from the start, becomes nonexistent. Id. Additionally, there exist many intangible assets, such as
goodwill, name recognition, and customer loyalty, none ofwhich is typically valued on a balance sheet.
See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 37. Perhaps the only redeeming feature ofthis pure net asset
valuation method is that it can be performed expeditiously, and it relies on a fixed book value figure,
removing much of the subjectivity inherent in other valuation methods discussed below. Id. at 36.
59. See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 33, §§ 3, 39-42 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000).
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identifies and accounts for off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. 60 This adjusted
approach may be useful if much of the corporation's value is derived from its
assets.61However, if the corporation's value is not in its assets, but in its earnings,
the net asset value method should be accorded less weight.62
C. Market Value Method
Market value is the second major valuation method considered in South
Carolina. The method actually has two forms. The first form is known as the
guideline company method ("GCM").63 This method is particularly useful when
similar corporations are available for comparison.' However, if guideline
companies cannot be found the courts must rely on previous sales of the closely
held corporation's stock. 65 This second form is not favored because closely held
corporations' stocks are typically infrequently traded, and the sales often occur
between related parties.66
The steps involved in applying the GCM are not complex, though they do
require more time and thought than the net asset value method. In effect, the
appraiser selects similarly situated, publicly traded companies ("guideline67
companies"), and from these companies the appraiser derives "value measures."

60. See SOLOMON& SARET, supra note 2, at 39. Solomon and Saret suggest that off-balance sheet
assets such as internally generated goodwill should be identified for recognition under the adjusted book
value method. Id.Additionally, the authors claim that off-balance sheet (contingent) liabilities must be
recognized and valued as well. Id. These contingent liabilities include, interalia, pending litigation
claims, warranty claims, tax claims, and contractual claims. Id.
61. See Morrow v. Martschink, 922 F.Supp. 1093, 1103 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating "[a]s a general
rule, more weight is given to asset value than to earnings in an asset holding company such as a real
estate business, whereas the reverse is generally true of a manufacturing company or other company
producing goods and services" (citing Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interests, 33
MERCER L. REV. 457, 460 (1982))).
62. Morrow,922 F.Supp. at 1103. TheMorrowcourt concluded that "essentially all of the value
of the corporate shares derive[d] from the net asset value of the corporation ... [and] that the
corporation's net asset value represent[ed] the fair value of the corporation's stock." Id.
63. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 56. ("The GCM's underlying rationale is that
numerous public stock transactions on the public markets constitute good evidence from which
valuation professionals may derive values of similarly situated nonpublic businesses.").
64. Id. Obviously, if the selected guideline companies are truly similar to the closely held
corporation, this method provides a very direct, market-based indication of the closely held
corporation's stock value. See SHANNON P. PRATT, SELECTING EXPERTS AND EVALUATING EXPERTS'

WoRKPRODUCT 41 (1999) [hereinafter SELECTING EXPERTS] (noting that this method is "[b]ased on
public market daily transactions").
65. See Belk of Spartanburg, S.C.v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 124-25,522 S.E.2d 357, 365 (Ct.
App. 1999).

66. Id. at 125, 522 S.E.2d at 365. A sale between related parties is not at "ann's length." An
arm's length transaction is one "negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting for his or her own self
interest. [This type of transaction is] the basis for a fair market value determination." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 71-72 (6th ed. 1991). Therefore, related-party transactions may not accurately reflect the
fair market value of the stock.
67. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 56.
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These value measures are then applied to the financial data of the company being
valued, and the value conclusion is reached.6"
Selecting the guideline companies is probably the most challenging step of the
process and also the most critical.69 When dealing with a closely held corporation,
finding similarly situated public guideline companies can be quite difficult. Failure
to find such guideline companies can be fatal to an expert's analysis.7"
However, with careful documentation and assiduous attention to each potential
guideline company's attributes, a diligent valuation expert can often find suitable
guideline companies for use in the valuation. The important comparative factors
include the following: business or product lines, capital structure, market or
geographic region, earnings and dividend-paying capacity, size and position in the
industry, credit status, depth of management and personnel experience, nature of
competition, and maturity of the business.71 From a practical standpoint, a closer
correlation between the guideline and subject companies, along with greater trading
volume of the guideline company, will generally require the selection of fewer
guideline companies to perform the valuation analysis.72
After selecting suitable guideline companies, the valuation expert develops
"valuation measures." 73 These measures are usually predicated upon income
statement accounts such as net income before taxes, net sales, or dividends.74 The
rationale behind using income statement valuation measures, rather than those based
upon balance sheet accounts, is that the income statement reflects a company's
earnings-generating capacity over time and is thus a more stable and reliable
indicator of value.75 By contrast, the balance sheet, with its asset and liability
accounts, merely "reflect[s] a relationship between value and balance sheet items
at a particular point in time."76 Therefore, value measures based on the balance
sheet will be less reliable because the balance sheet is not an averaging of past
performance but merely a snapshot ofa company's financial picture at one moment
in time.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 58.
70. See Belk, 337 S.C. at 116-17, 522 S.E.2d at 361.
71. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 59-60. Solomon and Saret also cite the IRS's
Revenue Ruling 59-60, which reemphasizes the need to select guideline corporations engaged in the
same or similar lines of business as the subject entity. Id. at 58 (citing Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B.
237, 242). Additionally, the IRS notes that the guideline corporation's stock must be actively traded
by the public, preferably listed on an exchange, but at the very least traded on the over-the-counter
market. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237,242; see also Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M.
849, 860 (1992) (eviscerating the IRS's valuation analysis because the guideline companies selected
were not comparable to the closely held corporation and noting that this failure tainted the entire
valuation).
72. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 60.
73. Id. at 56. Extensive discussion of the development ofvalue measures is beyond the scope of
this Note. However, for an excellent discussion of the selection and application of these measures, see
id. at 60-66.
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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After the valuation measures are chosen, they are applied to the subject
company's financial data." Although this process sounds simple, it requires
adjustments to the financial statements of both the guideline and the subject entity
to ensure that the financial data are comparable.7" Additionally, assuming that
multiple valuation measures have been selected, the valuation professionals must
decide how much weight to place on each valuation measure as well as on each
guideline company.79 Obviously, a great deal of subjectivity and professional
judgment enter the evaluation at this juncture. The appraiser may ascribe more
weight to a particular company or value measure based merely on the appraiser's
confidence in the comparability of the data.8"
A final interesting aspect of the market value method is its relation to minority
and marketability discounts, discussed further below. The GCM is based on public
market daily transactions, and these transactions reflect the sale of minority, fully
marketable interests."1 Because publicly traded shares are always minority interests,
they have already been discounted by the market from their intrinsic value.82
However, since publicly traded minority stocks are almost limitlessly marketable,
and closely held corporations' minority stock interests are not, some commentators
believe that a "discount for lack of marketability ... should be applied." 3 The
myriad differences between publicly traded and closely held corporations have
prompted certain commentators to claim that the market value method is not
appropriate for dissenters' rights cases.8 Regardless of its flaws, this valuation
method is firmly established in South Carolina's jurisprudence.8 5 As shown in the
preceding discussion, this method can be extremely valuable if comparability
between private and public companies can be established with some reliability, or,
to a lesser extent, ifa reconstructed market for the closely held stock can be created.
D. Earnings/IncomeMethod
The earnings method has been called "the most important of the three basic
approaches to business valuation."86 This approach is bottomed on the proposition
77. Id. at 56.
78. See SOLOMON&SARET, supranote 2, at 64. These adjustments may be necessary to reconcile
differing accounting methods, and to harmonize the entities' extraordinary, nonrecurring, and
nonoperating items. Id.
79. Id. at 65.
80. Id.
81. See SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 41.
82. Id.Assessing a minority discount on the closely held minority stock would in effect "double
discount" the stock. Obviously, if only minority interests are traded on public exchanges, the market
accounts for and implicitly assesses such a minority discount to those shares, so further devaluing of
the closely held minority equity interest is inappropriate. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 57-58 ("The GCM is most valuable
when... the applicable standard of value is the fair market value standard... rather than another
standard (for example, fair value for corporate dissenting rights actions) .... ).
85. See Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 274, 217 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1975).
86. Id. at 46.
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that the value of a share of stock is equal to the "present value of [anticipated]
future cash flows.""7 Future benefits of ownership also accrue to the shareholder in
the form of capital appreciation."8 There are two basic versions of the income
method: the capitalized earnings approach and the discounted earnings approach.89
The capitalized earnings approach focuses on a single historical measure of
investment return.' The selected measure is divided by a "capitalization rate that
reflects both the risk and the expected rate of growth" of the estimated future cash
flows.9 The capitalized approach assumes that past results will continue into the
future and therefore relies on these past results as indicative of stock value.92
Gathering the data to conduct a capitalized approach is notparticularly difficult.
The measure of investment return may be as simple as net cash flow or net income
from the prior year; however, the averaging of several years' worth of financial data
produces a more reliable and stable indicator of historical trends that can be
expected to continue into the future. 93
The difficulty in the capitalization method lies in the selection of an appropriate
capitalization rate. As mentioned above,94 this rate should reflect both the risk and
the rate of growth of the investment. This rate effectively encompasses growth
expected beyond the current time, as the data to which it is applied reflects only a
current return." The risk of an investment may be thought of as "the certainty (or
uncertainty) as to the realization of the expected returns on the investment, both as
to amounts and timing." 96 The capitalization rate effectively "equals the rate of
return required to induce investors to commit available funds to the subject
investment, taking into consideration its risk level."97 The risk level of any equity

87. Id.
88. Id. at 48. The Belk court, citing Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 143 (Del. 1980),
noted that "[n]ormally the demonstrated capacity of the corporation to earn money and pay dividends
is very important in determining the value of its stock." Belk of Spartanburg, S.C. v. Thompson, 337
S.C. 109, 121,522 S.E.2d 357, 363 (Ct. App. 1999).
89. See SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 38.
90. Id. Typically, the prior year's net cash flow or net income is the measure of return used. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 47.
93. See Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co. 158 A.2d 797 (Del. Ch. 1960). The Adams court noted
that "[a]n important purpose behind the practice of taking the average of several years [sic] earnings
for the purpose of capitalizing earnings is to balance extraordinary profits and losses." Id. The court
therefore rejected the appraiser's determination of "average" earnings for capitalization purposes
because he had "limited himself to a two year period." Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 91.
95. See SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 39.
96. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
97. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 49. Although Solomon and Saret do not explicitly
discuss the capitalization method in their rate ofreturn analysis, much of their analysis devoted to the
discount method is applicable, given that both the capitalized earnings and discounted earnings methods
require determination ofa rate ofreturn to calculate present value. See SELECTINGEXPERTS, supranote
64, at 38-39. Additionally, the 'apitalization rate "equals the discount rate less the growth rate." Id. at
39. The only effective difference between the two rates is that the capitalization rate assumes constant
future growth, thus obviating the need to include any future growth rate in its formula, whereas the
discount rate does not assume that past results will continue into the future. See SOLOMON & SARET,
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investment is the product of two components: the risk-free rate and the risk
premium.9" By aggregating these two components, investors can realistically assess
the chances that they will realize their expected future returns. The riskier the
investment, the lower the value that will be assigned to the stock.99
To reiterate, the discounted earnings approach is used when past returns are not
expected to continue into the future. 0 Unlike the capitalization rate, which reflects
only growth beyond the current time, the discount rate reflects the "total rate of
return that the investor expects to realize over the life of the investment."' 0 ' The
discounted approach is increasingly being approved by the courts, partly because
this approach is being employed more and more often by practitioners and also
because the methodology has been clearly laid out in reference sources.'0 2Although
the discounted earnings approach is gaining currency, this method requires courts
to take a leap of faith. As opposed to viewing objectively verifiable historical data,
courts are forced to accept experts' testimony that market conditions will change
and these experts' educated guesses as to how they will change. Obviously,
corporations that derive most of their value from asset holdings are not likely to be
valued under this income-based approach. 3

supra note 2, at 47. Although extensive risk analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, Solomon and
Saret conclude that the rate ofreturn (capitalization or discount rate) will equal the cost of capital, or,
in stock valuation cases, the cost of equity. Id. at 49.
98. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 49. The authors discuss two prevalent financial
models for estimating risk, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing model
(APM). Id. at 52-56. An extensive study of these models is unnecessary for the purposes of this Note,
but it is important to recognize that each method uses a slightly different approach to evaluate the
components of risk. The risk-free rate "equals the rate of return on investments that are free of default
risk, such as U.S. Treasury bonds." Id. at 50. This rate effectively compensates investors for inflation,
and for renting their money to the corporation. Id. "The risk premium is the additional rate ofreturn that
investors demand to induce them to invest in investments in which there is the possibility of default."
Id. For example, corporate stock and non-U.S. Treasury bonds both involve a risk of default. Id. As a
general rule, smaller corporations have higher rates of return concomitant with the associated higher
risk of default. Id. at 51.
99. An illustrative example is useful here. If a stock is assessed as having a capitalization rate of
twenty percent, next year's expected returns will be divided by 1.20, the next year's returns will be
divided by (1.20)2, and so forth, for whatever period the appraiser chooses (linked to how long the
investor plans to hold his stock). The less risky stock may only be assigned a capitalization rate of
fifteen percent, and thus its expected returns will be divided by 1.15, then, in the following year, by
(1.15)2, and so forth. As is obvious from this simple example, the discount/capitalization rate will
increase at an increasing rate for the riskier investment; therefore, the present value of the riskier
investment will be significantly lower than that of the less risky investment. Id. at 47.
100. See supra note 97.
101. SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 38 (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. at 39. Pratt cites a Delaware case calling the discounted approach "increasingly, the
method of choice in this court." Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., No. 12334, 1997 WL
538676, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1997).
103. See Morrow v. Martschink, 922 F.Supp. 1093, 1103 (D.S.C. 1995).
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E. Application ofthe Three ValuationMethods in Belk
The Belk court weighted the net asset value method as 60% of the closely held
corporation's value, a far greater weight than the discounted earnings or market
methods of value were accorded.'4 Belk suggested that the net asset value method
was particularly appropriate because the corporation to be valued had recently
undergone major renovation to one of its stores.001 "Obviously, BDS was using
more than an average amount of its assets to expand and improve its business
opportunities. This investment of course was not reflected in earnings at the time
of the merger,... [but] the directors and shareholders ...[testified that], at long
range, it would be profitable."' 6 In other words, the renovation was "essential to the
ability of BOS/BDS to eventually generate earnings and pay dividends."10 7
Interestingly, the Belk analysis ignored the fact that a minority interest was
being valued within the context of this method. As Pratt succinctly states, "The [net
asset value] approach tends to be used when valuing a controlling interest, since a
minority interest normally would have no access to or control over the assets. If a
minority interest is being valued using the asset approach, it may be appropriate to
apply a minority interest and/or marketability discount."' 5 As discussed later,
discounts are a controversial issue in dissenters' rights cases, yet the Belk court
chose not to address the issue at all. 0 9
The court assigned a "weight of only 25%" to the market value method.' The
appraisal report given by the dissenters' expert concerning the guideline company
method was discounted in part because the expert testified that "'[t]here were
significant differences among [sic] the guideline [public] companies and BOS in
terms of capital structure, size, and growth rates in revenues and profits."' 1 The
expert admitted in his testimony that ownership in the closely held Belk corporation
was "'clearly and significantly different from owning stock in one of those large
traded companies.' 2 This appraisal testimony clearly involved extensive
guesswork and assumptions to the extent that the court felt uncomfortable using this
testimony in valuing the closely held corporation." 3

104.
1999).
105.
106.
107.

Belk of Spartanburg, S.C. v. Thompson, 337 S.C. 109, 126,522 S.E.2d 357,366 (Ct. App.
Id. at 125, 522 S.E.2d at 365.
Id. at 125-26, 522 S.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 126, 522 S.E.2d at 366.

108. SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 44.

109. Belk, 337 S.C. at 126, 522 S.E.2d at 366. For a case discussing minority and marketability
discounts, see Morrow v. Martschink, 922 F. Supp. 1093, 1105 (D.S.C. 1995).
110. Belk, 337 S.C. at 125, 522 S.E.2d at 365.
111. Id. at 120, 522 S.E.2d at 363.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 121,522 S.E.2d at 363. The appraiser acknowledged that "there's great difficulty in
even using this method.... [B]ut I went about it anyway and derived certain multiples and then
adjusted them ...based on my judgment, for the fact that we're dealing with a hugely different
situation here." Id. at 120, 522 S.E.2d at 363.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:391

The court noted that "[t]he weight to be given market value is related to the
nature and extent of the market in the stock and how fairly it reflects the judgment
of informed buyers and sellers.' 14 Clearly, this closely held corporation had no
ready market," 5 but Santee dictates that "ifthere is no reliable established market
value for the shares a reconstructed market, if one can be made, must be given
consideration.'. 16 Thus, although it expressed discomfort at relying on a "mere three
trades," the Belk court reconstructed a market for the closely held corporation's
stock based on three recent stock sales.' 17 However, based on the stock's infrequent
trading, the market value method was not weighted very heavily." 8
The opinion illustrates the difficulty of applying the market value method to
closely held corporations. Although many commentators draw no distinction
between the guideline company method and the method which relies on earlier
trades ofthe closely held stock,119 Belk demonstrates that they are not synonymous.
Clearly, the GCM is preferable because itproduces a direct market-based indication
of stock value, but if comparable guideline companies cannot be located, South
Carolina courts will attempt to reconstruct a market for the closely held entity's
stock. 12 In reconstructing this private market, the courts must diligently examine
the relevant stock sales to ensure that they have been fairly negotiated.'
The Belk court weighted the earnings method least, as only fifteen percent of
the stock's value.' It preferred the capitalized approach over the discounted
approach because "[p]ast experience represented by the actual figures are [sic] of
prime importance.'1 3 Thompson's appraiser attempted to sway the Belk court to
adopt the discounted approach by arguing that the use of historical cash flows was
inappropriate due to 'changing market conditions in the BOS trade area."" 24 The
appraiser, however, "used a rate of return based on market information for the large
chain department stores ....[adjusting] this rate 'for the small size and companyspecific risks associated with BOS' as a closely held corporation.' Based on
uncertain market conditions, and on the appraiser's "total dependence on

114. Id. at 124,522 S.E.2d at 365 (quotingln re Tudor City Fifth Unit, Inc., 232 N.Y.S.2d 758,
760 (1962), aff'd 193 N.E.2d 222, 222 (1963)).
115. As the court noted, all of the stores in the Belk organization are owned by closely held
corporations. Id.
116. Santee Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270,273,217 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1975).
117. Belk, 337 S.C. at 125, 522 S.E.2d at 365. Note that these stock sales were made among the
closely held stockholders, and were not public market trades.
118. Id. The court was willing to rely on three trades because the closely held stock was traded
very infrequently, and the Santee court relied on only one trade in its valuation. Id.
119. See, e.g., SOLOMON & SARET, supranote 2, at 56 (discussing only the guideline company
method and ignoring market reconstruction based on earlier trades of the closely held stock).
120. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
122. Belk, 337 S.C. at 122, 522 S.E.2d at 364.
123. Id. (quoting Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 158 A.2d 797, 800 (Del. Ch. 1960)).
124. Id. at 121, 522 S.E.2d at 363.
125. Id.
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projections," the Belk court rejected his discounted earnings approach. 126 Simply
put, his methodology was too undependable to be palatable to the court. 27
F. Minority and MarketabilityDiscounts

The Belk court ignored minority and marketability discounts, offering no
guidance on the issue in dissenters' rights cases. The debate over whether or not to
include such discounts is far from decided, and different states approach this issue
very dissimilarly.' In order to evaluate these discounts, it is important to
understand what they represent.
A minority discount accounts for the lack of control inherent in minority
investments. In a closely held corporation, a control owner enjoys many rights and
powers.' 29 These prerogatives include the following: the power to appoint
management; determine management compensation; acquire or liquidate assets;
liquidate, dissolve, sell-out, or recapitalize the company; declare and pay dividends;
make acquisitions; and change the articles of incorporation or bylaws.13 Not
surprisingly, this discount is often referred to as a non-control discount, and
controlling shareholders are often granted a control premium when they sell their
controlling interests. 3'
Several rationales underpin the minority discount, including "(1) self-dealing

opportunities; (2) reduction of investment risk due to superior information and
control over the entity's actions; and (3) control over the distribution of the entity's
cash flow to its owners."' 13 2 The presence of self-dealing opportunities is the most
important of the three rationales supporting the application of a minority discount

126. Id. at 122, 522 S.E.2d at 364.
127. Id.
128. See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Proprietyof Applying MinorityDiscount to Value of
Shares Purchasedby Corporationor Its ShareholdersFrom Minority Shareholders,13 A.L.R. 5th
840, 863 (1993). Vaeth compiles various dissenters' rights (and other) cases, some ofwhich reject the
application of discounts, and others of which conclude that such application is a matter of discretion
for the court. In Cavalier Oil. Corp. v. Hartnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989), an important
Delaware case, the court held that Delaware's dissenters' rights statute was designed to value the
corporation itself, rather than a specific fraction of the corporation's shares existing in the hands of a
particular shareholder. Id. Thus, the dissenters' equity interests were valued based solely on their
proportionate share of the company's stock after the valuation had occurred at the corporate level, and
no further discounts needed to be applied at the shareholder level. Id.; see also Tri-Continental Corp.
v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. Ch. 1950) (holding that any further discount at the shareholder level
would punish the shareholder, treating him as if he had sold his stock, subject to the minority discount,
in the open market; although the minority discount was upheld at the corporate level, the appraisal
process assumed that the dissenting shareholder would have been willing to maintain his investment
position had the merger not occurred, rather than reconstructing aproforma sale). For a case allowing
a minority discount, see Atlantic States Constr., Inc. v. Beavers, 314 S.E.2d 245, 251 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a "minority interest" factor can be considered at the individual stockholder level
when relevant to the fair value of the dissenter's stock).
129. SELECTING EXPERTS, supra note 64, at 47.
130. Id.
131. SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 106-07.
132. Id. at 109.
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in dissenters' rights cases. A controlling shareholder "may cause the entity to do
business with other entities that the owner owns or controls, with the owner himself,
or with his or her family members.' 33 However, these opportunities are often
constrained by the majority shareholder's duty of loyalty to minority interests, 1as
34
well as by governmental regulations and the financial condition of the business.
Reduction of investment risks through superior information and control may
manifest itself in insider trading, managerial changes to improve performance, or
modification of the corporation's bylaws or articles of incorporation.' 35 However,
strict insider trading laws often weaken the controlling shareholder's advantage
under this theory." 6
The third theory supporting a minority discount concerns the majority
shareholder's control over the entity's cash flow. By exercising this control,
majority shareholders may distribute dividends to themselves, or they may steer
cash to themselves by forcing the entity to do business with them. 37 However, as
with the other two theories, state law and contractual provisions may limit the3
controlling shareholder's power to direct the corporation's assets in this manner. 1
The minority discount analysis does not exist in a vacuum. Such analysis varies
based on the applicable valuation standard.'39 In dissenters' rights cases, where the
"fairvalue" standard generally applies, "planners must look atprecedential case law
under the applicable state statute when conducting the control analysis."' 40
Many commentators believe that minority discounts in the context of dissenters'
rights cases are inappropriate.'.4 "[M]ost jurisdictions have concluded that a
dissenting shareholder is entitled to a proportionate share in the value of the
corporation as a whole. This standard accords with the minority shareholder
protection rationale ofthe appraisal remedy.' ' 142 Although minority discounts have
a fairly strong theoretical underpinning, it appears that, in practice, they are
infrequently applied in dissenters' rights cases.
Lack-of-marketability discounts reflect the lack of a ready market in which
owners of closely held corporations can sell their stock. 43 Put simply, investors
prefer liquid assets, not onlybecause they can quickly obtain cash for their interests,
but also because transaction costs are minimal and the realization of net proceeds
133. Id.
134. Id. at 110.
135. Id. at 111.
136. Id.
137. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 111.
138. Id. at 112.
139. Id. at 112-13.
140. Id. at 113.
141. See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 649 (stating that "dissenting shareholders should be
entitled to receive a pro rata share of the value of the corporation as a whole, rather than the value of
their minority interest; dissenting shares should not be subject to a minority discount; and a market
price based valuation should receive an upward adjustment to eliminate the minority discount inherent
therein").
142. Id.at 654. As stated above, this proportionate share in the total value of the going concern
is the stock's intrinsic value. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
143. See SOLOMON & SARET, supra note 2, at 140.
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is a practical certainty." A holder of publicly traded stock can almost immediately
liquidate it, usually at an amount that is ascertainable before the sale. 145 By contrast,
a minority holder of closely held stock must search for a buyer, then negotiate the
terms of sale.' 46 Minority shareholders also face a daunting legal hurdle in that they
cannot sell their stock to the public without either registering the transaction with
federal and 14state securities regulators or qualifying for an exemption from
registration. 1
Should these discounts be applied in dissenters' rights cases? Although tax
court decisions routinely uphold such discounts, 48 these cases seek fair market
value under a "willing seller, willing buyer methodology.' ' 149 By contrast,
dissenters' rights statutes involve forced buy-outs and seek the fair value of the
"squeezed-out" minority interest. 50 Accordingly, the importation of valuation
analysis from tax cases to appraisal and dissenters' actions is fraught with peril and
seems logically flawed.' As noted above,' 52 most jurisdictions have rejected
discounts in valuing minority stockholders' shares. 5 As one commentator opines,
"minority shareholders are no longer helpless in the face of majority misconduct.
The specter of being 'locked-in' but frozen out is being relegated to history."' 54 This
commentator concludes that the majority of courts are correct in rejecting "minority
and liquidity discounts that can have a dramatic and devastating impact on the value
of minority interests."' 55
Based on the overall import of the term "fair value," it appears that the courts
that have considered and rejected the idea of applying minority and marketability
discounts have been correct. The very nature of the term "dissenter" implies that
certain parties are being compelled into some act against their wishes-here, to
some corporate action to which they object. Given the huge power held by the

144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 141.
148. See, e.g., Estate of Simplotv. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 130,153-54 (1999) (holding that "in
valuing stock in closely held corporations, discounts are usually warranted... because a ready market

for shares in the corporations does not exist").
149. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution ofEffective Remediesfor Minority Shareholders
and Its Impact Upon Valuation ofMinority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 425, 479-80 (1990).
150. Id. at 480.
15 1. See id. Murdock argues that discounts have been employed as part of a traditionally

conservative approach to valuation from a tax perspective, but that they are inappropriate in dissenters'
rights cases. Id. at 479-80. In addition to the differing value measures, "[i]n the tax situation, it is the
levying of a tax that mandates the sale" whereas in the dissenters' rights context, "it is the conduct of
those in control [the majority interest] that forces the sale." Id.at 480. In the latter situation, the holder
"realize[s] the value of the shares at a time the holder deems most propitious," while in the former, this
choice does not exist. Id. Additionally, the minority shareholder loses from a high valuation in tax cases
but loses from a low valuation in dissenters' rights cases. Id. These differences lead Murdock to the
conclusion that tax valuation theory should not be imported into the dissenters' rights context. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
153. Murdock, supra note 149, at 480-81.
154. Id. at 484.
155. Id. at489.
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majority interest to control a closely held corporation, it seems that minority
shareholders should be compensated fully for their shares, even at the risk of
occasional over-compensation." 6 This risk is preferable to a situation where
dissenting shareholders are forced to choose among two evils, either consenting to
an act with which they disagree
or dissenting from the act and receiving an unfairly
15 7
low value for their shares.
IV. CONCLUSION

Courts and commentators have been faced with flexible but vague statutory
directives in the area of dissenters' rights. Ultimately, fairness must be decided on
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Despite the fact-specific nature
of valuation analysis, understanding the set of financial rights and obligations that
accompanies stock ownership aids in the valuation process.
Minority shareholders' rights must not be trampled by the power of a
dominating majority. At the same time, the majority's right to engage in
entrepreneurial pursuits must not be thwarted by unreasonable nuisance suits and
over-regulation. As with most legal issues, a careful balance must be struck. The
dissenters' rights statute can be an excellent tool if employed properly to strike this
delicate balance. However, if applied improperly, the statute may work onerous
injustices upon either the majority or the minority shareholder. Understanding the
various financial forces at play in the context of valuing minority interests in closely
held corporations is conducive to an informed application of the dissenters' rights
statute, and this understanding will help lawyers and judges reach the goal of full
and fair compensation.
JoshuaR. Williams

156. See Hollis, supra note 50, at 141-42. Hollis argues that "[i]n the case of a non-publicly
traded company, the market value should not be a factor in establishing the fair value of the company."
Id.at 142. Obviously, if market value is not a component of fair value, imposing a lack ofmarketability
discount on the minority shareholders' interests is unfair and "grant[s] the majority an unfair windfall."
Id. Hollis ultimately concludes that the purpose of the dissenters' rights statutes is full compensation
and thus believes "[d]iscounts by definition will only take what rightfully belongs to the dissenting
shareholder, and as such, they are intrinsically unfair." Id. at 160.
157. As Murdock points out, "statutory provisions have been enacted for the benefit ofminority
shareholders and... minority shareholders ought not to be punished in the valuation process."
Murdock, supra note 149, at 484 (citations omitted).
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